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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between the financial crisis and earnings 
management of non-financial listed companies from 25 countries which belonged to the 
EU in 2006, over the period 2006-2014. Also, I intend to study whether the dividend 
distribution is motivation for companies to earnings management. In this empirical 
work, we use the discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management and the 
results were obtained using the OLS model. Our results suggest that earnings 
management by firms is lower in periods of financial crisis and firms that pay dividends 
have no tendency to earnings management. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has been the subject of interest of several empirical researches in 
recent years (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The authors are 
interested in the study of earnings management to understand the impact of the recent 
financial crisis, as in the studies of the Filip and Raffournier (2014) and Cimini (2015). 
The financial crisis and recent financial scandals associated with inappropriate 
accounting practices has reduced the confidence of investors, harming financial firms 
listed on the stock exchange (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009). 
The quality of accounting information is important for all users of information for the 
decision making process, including customers, managers, market, state, but specifically 
for investors (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). The investors’ confidence during the financial 
crisis decrease, because they believe that the flexibility of accounting standards and 
opportunism of managers make the earnings management affect the quality of financial 
statements (Gorgan et al., 2012). 
Previous studies conclude that the earnings management decreases during the financial 
crisis and as investors expect greater earnings management, incentives to earnings 
management are lower (Cohen and Zarowin, 2007; Kousenidis et al., 2013; Cimini, 
2015). Therefore, our research intends to increase the knowledge on this relevant topic 
and increase empirical evidence from existing literature.  
In this sense, the main purpose of the study is to verify whether earnings management is 
related to the periods of financial crisis. Furthermore, we study if the dividend 
distribution is one of the incentives for earnings management. Our study is an evolution 
of the study of Cimini (2015), because in addition to study 25 EU countries, we added 
the study of incentives of earnings management. Another differentiating factor of this 
study is the methodology used, which is more recent and more common in studies on 
the earnings management. The sample used in the research consists of non-financial 
firms listed of 25 EU countries for the period 2006-2014. The data were collected from 
Datastream database and the final sample includes a total of 2404 firms. The model 
used in the study is of Kothari et al., (2005), that it is an improved version of the 
Modified Jones Model. 
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First, we calculated the discretionary accruals by the model of Kothari et al., (2005). 
The discretionary accruals are a proxy of the earnings management. Then, we developed 
an empirical model with control variables, that was estimated by the method of ordinary 
least squares (OLS), examining the relationship between discretionary accruals with 
financial crisis, dividend distribution and other variables included in the study. 
Our main results can be divided into two groups. First, our findings suggest that 
earnings management decreases in the crisis period. The average of the discretionary 
accruals is less in the crisis period, suggesting that there is more quality of reported 
financial statements. 
Second, our results that are related with the incentives to manipulate the earnings, 
suggest that earnings management is not one of the incentives to manipulate the 
earnings. 
This research contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, it is a current topic 
and one of great interest to society and academics. The literature has many studies on 
earnings management, but few are the authors who refer to the EU, which makes this 
research even more relevant. Second, the study uses a very large sample, studying 25 
countries, and the majority of the investigations related to the topic just study some 
countries in specific, for example, those countries that were in a more fragile situation to 
economic and financial developments during the financial crisis. Thirdly, in addition to 
the study of the relationship of earnings management with financial crisis, we studied a 
possible incentive for the earnings management, also studied by Naveen D. et al., 
(2007). Most research only studies the relationship of the financial crisis with the 
earnings management or just the incentives that lead to the earnings management. Few 
researches study these two components simultaneously. Finally, the empirical model 
used to study the relationship between discretionary accruals and the financial crisis, the 
dividend distributions and the remaining variables that may be related to the earnings 
management, was a model built on the study in a large set of articles that examined 
what business characteristics and conditions which firms are subordinated that lead to 
the earnings management. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the literature 
review, as well the hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the sample and 
descriptive statistics. In section 4 the methodology includes the definition of variables 
and empirical models and section 5 describes the results. Finally, section 6 shows the 
conclusions, the limitation of the study and future research suggestions.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In recent years, the earnings management has been a topic of interest to be studied by 
researchers. However, there is no consensus about what is the earnings management, so 
there are different interpretations of the concept (Beneish, 2001). 
In this context, Schipper (1989, pp.92) defines earnings management as "purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining some 
private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitation the neutral operation of the 
process)". In turn, to Healy and Wahlen (1999) the earnings management occurs when 
managers decide to modify financial reporting to either mislead stakeholders about the 
economic performance of the firm or to influence the earnings that depend on 
accounting indicators. 
Many studies of earnings management have in common changes in financial reporting, 
so that there is flexibility in the accounting principles that allow managers to change the 
results of the firms. Thus, manipulation of results is carried out within the limits of 
accounting principles. When the earnings management is done outside of the flexibility 
allowed by accounting principles it is considered fraud, which is defined by 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, pp. 159) as “an intentional act by one or 
more individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees, or 
third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage.” 
So, many studies examine whether managers are opportunistic in terms of earnings 
management (Naveen D. et al., 2007).  
 
2.1. Models to study earnings management 
There are several models to study the earnings management, but the most used in the 
literature are the models based on accruals, because they allow us to understand the 
behaviour of discretionary accruals and identify earnings management practices carried 
out by managers.  
The models based on accruals allow us to distinguish between discretionary accruals 
and non-discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are the "normal" accruals to 
capture adjustments resulting from normal activity of the company and discretionary 
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accruals, called "abnormal" accruals, are used to capture the distortions resulting from 
the practice of earnings management. The sum of discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals result in total accruals. The accruals models are used to estimate 
the levels of "normal" accruals and residuals from the models are used as a measure of 
discretionary accruals. (Dechow et al., 2010).  
According to Dechow et al., (2010), the discretionary accruals are used by many authors 
as a proxy for the measure of earnings quality and the most widely used accruals models 
are Jones (1991), Dechow et al., (1955), Kothari et al., (2005), Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis et al., (2005). 
Jones (1991) model assumes that the accruals are due to the sales growth and are used 
to control the economic environment of the company, and includes the gross property, 
plant and equipment to capture the total accruals related to non-discretionary 
depreciation expenses. So, the model proposed by Jones to estimate the accruals is as 
follows: 
 
Where: 
TAit = total accruals for firm i at year t; 
ΔREVit = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i; 
PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment for firm i at year t; 
Ait-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i; 
Εit = error term for firm i at year t. 
All variables in model are scaled by lagged assets. 
However, Jones model assumes that sales are not manipulated. With the aim to 
overcome this limitation, Dechow et al., (1995) proposed a Modified Jones Model, 
which assumes that the credit sales are resulted from earnings management. The 
parameter estimates and non-discretionary accruals are obtained in the same way as the 
original Jones Model. 
The model proposed is the following: 
 
Where ΔRECit = net receivables at year t less net receivables at year t-1 for firm i. 
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In turn, Kothari et al., (2005) conclude that the methods for determining discretionary 
accruals have less specificity for companies with performance out of the normal. Thus, 
with the aim to control the effect of performance on measured discretionary accrual, 
they suggest that one should add the return on assets (ROA) variable to the Modified 
Jones Model. So, the model is as follows: 
 
Kothari et al., (2005) define ΔSales as change in revenues less change in receivable 
(ΔREV – ΔREC), as calculated in Modified Jones Model. The authors also present 
results using matching performance with return on assets for the current year and the 
past year, ROAt and ROAt-1, respectively. They concluded that matching based on 
ROAt-1 performance is worse that using ROAt. 
 
2.2. Earnings management and earnings quality 
To study the earnings management, the authors use models that measure the results 
quality with indicators such as accruals, persistence, timeliness and smoothness. 
Dechow et al., (2010) emphasize that earnings quality is a proxy of firm’s fundamental 
performance. The authors define earnings quality as a proxy of firm’s performance and 
they suggest that high earnings quality is relevant to a future decision.  
Kin Lo (2008) says that high earnings management results in low quality of results. 
However, if a firm doesn’t practice earnings management it is not guaranteed to have 
results with high quality, because the quality of earnings depends on other factors. But, 
if we consider these factors that affect results quality, we can relate quality of results 
with results quality, and they are negatively related. 
 
2.3.  Earnings management and financial crisis 
More recently, earnings management has been the subject of great interest to be studied 
due to the recent financial crisis, however, few studies have investigated the subject 
using the EU as a reference (Cimini, 2015). Crãciun and Ochea (2004) concluded that 
the economic crisis originated volatility and resulting in increased uncertainty in the 
7 
 
business environment. Lang and Maffett (2011) claim that the liquidity variability 
increases during the financial crisis, especially in companies with less transparency in 
their financial reporting. 
However, despite several studies on the relationship of the financial crisis and earnings 
management, the results are very different and depend on whether they analysed 
financial or non-financial firms. When investigating the impact of the financial crisis in 
the earnings management of financial entities one usually finds an increase in the 
specific accruals, so the misrepresentation increases (Cimini, 2015). 
Regarding the study of non-financial companies, Cimini (2015) analysed 1692 non-
financial listed entities in the 15 countries that belonged to the EU at the time of 
issuance the Regulation 1606/2016 in the period 2006-2012, considering the years 
2008-2012 as crisis years. Adopting an event study methodology and analysing the 
abnormal accruals concluded that only in France and Luxembourg abnormal accruals 
estimated in the period before the crisis are higher than estimated in crisis years. They 
also concluded that the abnormal accruals during the crisis period are more negative 
than in the period before the crisis, suggesting that the decrease in earnings management 
is, probably, due to the high quality of financial reporting and audit quality on the 
financial crisis. 
Filip and Raffournier (2014) believe that studying the EU as a whole is more robust 
than a country by country approach. They found a decrease in earnings management in 
the crisis years, 2008-2009, for the period before the crisis, 2006-2007, studying the EU 
as a whole. However, they performed a robustness test and studying country by country 
concluded that not all countries have the same declining trend of earnings management 
and found an increase in earnings management in Austria, Belgium, France, Norway 
and Portugal. 
Likewise, Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) investigated the value relevance and the earnings 
management related to the financial crisis to 789 non-financial listed companies audited 
by the Big 4, over the period 2005-2011, for 5 European countries: Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Spain and Greece. They concluded that even being audited by the Big 4, 
companies have a tendency to resort to earnings management and Portugal, Italy and 
Greece have a stronger tendency towards earnings management. 
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Studying conservative accounting, Francis et al., (2013) find that the financial crisis 
increased the demand for high quality audit and high quality financial information. Also 
Kousenidis et al., (2013) studied whether incentives, induced by the crisis, to earnings 
management have led to differential effects in earnings quality. The authors examined 
value relevance, timeliness, conditional conservatism, smoothing, management, 
persistence and predictability as earnings quality attributes. They analysed 552 non- 
financial entities listed in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Spain over the period 
2008-2011. In order to study earnings management, the authors concluded a reduction 
of earnings management after financial crisis, because companies rely on external 
financing and have incentives to increase their financial reporting quality to attract 
prospective investors. 
Therefore, we hoped that the financial crisis would cause a decrease in the earnings 
management, so we defined our first research hypothesis: 
H1: The earnings management decreased with the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
2.4. Incentives to earnings management 
Managers can increase or decrease the earnings of firms according to their motivations 
and interests (Beneish, 2001). There are several incentives to manipulate the results, and 
we will study the dividend distribution (Naveen et al., 2007). 
Regarding the dividend distribution, Naveen et al., (2007) studied whether the firms 
control their earnings to meet dividend thresholds, because the restrictions of dividends 
are common in the debt contracts. The authors studied firms of S&P 1500 listed in 
Compustat's Execucomp database for the period 1992-2005 and excluded financial 
firms, utilities and firms that are not publicly traded. They concluded that the firms are 
prone to cut dividends if they don't get to eliminate the deficit through discretionary 
accruals and that the discretionary accruals increase for the firms that distribute 
dividends, but not for the firms that don't distribute, in other words, the firms that 
distribute dividends have a greater tendency to earnings management. 
More specifically, Kasanen et al., (1996) studies dividend-based earnings management 
in Finland for a sample of 37 Finnish listed firms over the period 1970-1989. They find 
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evidence of dividend impel the earnings management. The need to manage earnings 
results the contract to pay out the dividends to the controlling owners. So, the authors 
concluded that the firms increase earnings in response to the pressure of major 
shareholders to pay dividends. 
Thus, based on the existing literature, we define our second hypothesis: 
H2: The earnings management is positively associated with distribution of dividends. 
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3. Sample and descriptive statistics 
The sample used in the study is described in this section. First, we present all the sample 
construction process, followed by descriptive statistics. 
3.1. Sample 
The data used in this research were obtained from the Datastream database. The study is 
based on the analysis of non-financial listed firms, over the period of 2006 to 20141, 
which belong to the EU-252 countries listed below: Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary.  
We excluded financial firms (SIC codes 60-67) and utilities (SIC codes 49) because 
financial and utilities firms have specific regulations.  
Thus, the initial sample was of 6607 firms, and we deduct the sectors mentioned above, 
reducing our sample to 5411 firms. After, firms that do not have, at least, six full years 
of data were excluded and we also excluded the industries that had less than 10 firms. 
These restrictions result in a final sample of 2404 firms.  
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the composition of the sample by country. It appears that the sample 
mainly consists of United Kingdom, which represents 33,44% of the sample, followed 
by France with a weight in the sample of 15,22% and Germany with a total of 11,61% 
of sampled companies. These three countries have a large representation in the sample, 
they have more than half of the samples companies, i.e. 60,27%. 
The least representative country of the sample is Slovakia with a total of only two 
companies, representing 0,08% of the sample. Following the Czech Republic and 
Lithuania represented with five firms each, i.e. these countries represent 0,21% each. 
                                                          
1 We study the period 2006-2014, because we consider crisis years 2008-2012 and to study the 
relationship of earnings management and financial crisis, we analyse years before the crisis and years 
after the crisis, defining 2006-2007 as years before the crisis and 2013-2014 as years after the crisis.  
2 Our sample consists of 25 countries of EU, because we define the criteria to have the same number of 
countries in all years of study, so we choose to study all the countries that belonged to the EU in the first 
year of study, i.e. in 2006. 
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Table 1: Number the firms per country 
Country Total firms Percentage (%) 
Austria 34 1,41% 
Belgium 61 2,54% 
Cyprus 9 0,37% 
Czech Republic 5 0,21% 
Denmark 64 2,66% 
Estonia 10 0,42% 
Finland 89 3,70% 
France 366 15,22% 
Germany 279 11,61% 
Greece 79 3,29% 
Hungary 12 0,50% 
Italy 51 2,12% 
Ireland 145 6,03% 
Latvia 8 0,33% 
Lithuania 5 0,21% 
Luxembourg 9 0,37% 
Malta 7 0,29% 
Netherlands 70 2,91% 
Poland 109 4,53% 
Portugal 31 1,29% 
Slovakia 2 0,08% 
Slovenia 19 0,79% 
Spain 7 0,29% 
Sweden 129 5,37% 
United Kingdom 804 33,44% 
TOTAL 2404 100% 
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Table 2 presents the composition of the sample by industry.  
The industry 34, named Business Services, is the industry with the largest number of 
companies, with 407 companies, representing 16.93% of the total sample. Then, the 
industries with more weight in the sample are industry 42 (Retail), industry 21 
(Machinery), industry 18 (Construction) and 30 (Petroleum and Natural Gas) with 
4,87%, 4,83%, 4,53% and 4,45%, respectively. The industries with the fewest number 
of firms are industries 29 and 33, with 12 firms each, industry 39 with 15 firms, industry 
24 with 16 firms and industry 11 with 18 firms. 
All industries have more than 10 firms each, because we eliminated the industries with 
less than 10 firms, due to their low representation in the sample. 
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Table 2: Composition of the sample by industry 
Industry Denomination Total firms 
Percentage 
(%) 
1 Agriculture 44 1,83% 
2 Food Products 60 2,50% 
4 Beer & Liquor 35 1,46% 
6 Recreation 22 0,92% 
7 Entertainment 63 2,62% 
8 Printing and Publishing 48 2,00% 
9 Consumer Goods 59 2,45% 
10 Apparel 35 1,46% 
11 Healthcare 18 0,75% 
12 Medical Equipment 39 1,62% 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 72 3,00% 
14 Chemicals 68 2,83% 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 22 0,92% 
16 Textiles 22 0,92% 
17 Construction Materials 83 3,45% 
18 Construction 109 4,53% 
19 Steel Works Etc 49 2,04% 
21 Machinery 116 4,83% 
22 Electrical Equipment 36 1,50% 
23 Automobiles and Trucks 54 2,25% 
24 Aircraft 16 0,67% 
27 Precious Metals 58 2,41% 
28 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal 
Mining 53 2,20% 
29 Coal 12 0,50% 
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 107 4,45% 
32 Communication 94 3,91% 
33 Personal Services 12 0,50% 
34 Business Services 407 16,93% 
35 Computers 77 3,20% 
36 Electronic Equipment 92 3,83% 
37 Measuring and Control Equipment 20 0,83% 
38 Business Supplies 40 1,66% 
39 Shipping Containers 15 0,62% 
40 Transportation 93 3,87% 
41 Wholesale 88 3,66% 
42 Retail 117 4,87% 
43 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 49 2,04% 
TOTAL   2404 100% 
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4. Methodology  
In this chapter, we will describe the research methodology used in this study. First the 
variables are presented, followed by the research models and methods used in the 
analysis.  
To study the relationship of the financial crisis and the earnings management, we will 
use two empirical models. The first model allows us to discover discretionary accruals, 
which are the residues of the equation as in previous research. Then, the second model 
allows us to study the relationship of discretionary accruals with several incentives, 
namely the distribution of dividends, with the financial crisis.  
 
4.1. Variables 
To study whether certain incentives have, or not, an impact on earnings management 
using discretionary accruals and whether the earnings management and financial crisis 
are related, we will use a model that is based on a set of existing literature articles. 
However, despite the model has been built and adapted according to the incentives and 
relationship that we wanted to study, we base on study of Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008), and Silva (2013) to define the control variables to use. 
All the control variables used in this study, their abbreviation, description and expected 
signal are summarises in table 3.  
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Table 3: Definition and expected signal for variables 
Variable Abbreviation Definition 
 
Expected signal 
Discretionary 
accruals DA Residues of the first equation 
 
 
Crisis Crisis Dummy = 1 if year is 
2008,2009,2010,2011 or 2012, and 
0 otherwise. 
 
- 
Dividends Div 
Dummy = 1 if firm pays dividends, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
+ 
Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
+ 
Sales growth  Growth [(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest-1]*100 
 
? 
Debt Debt Total liabilities / Total assets 
 
+ 
Country Country Sum of country dummy variable 
 
 
Industry Industry Sum of industry dummy variable 
 
 
 
The model is composed of the dependent variable, discretionary accruals (DA), and a 
set of control variables, such as crisis, dividends, size, growth, debt, country and 
industry. Following a more detailed description of each variable: 
I) Discretionary accruals (DA) are a dependent variable of model (2) and are the 
residues of the first model. Discretionary accruals are employed as a proxy of 
earnings management and are often used to capture the accounting distortions 
and, as such, is related to the earnings management, we will use as a measure to 
study the relationship with certain incentives and the financial crisis of 2008. We 
consider the squared abnormal accruals as an inverse measure of earnings 
quality, because when accruals deviate significantly, we assume that deviations 
are discretionary accruals and reduce the earnings quality, as explained by 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalan (2011). 
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II) The recent financial crisis of 2008 has been the subject of study interest, because 
it could have earnings management to distort the negative impact of the crisis on 
firms. Therefore, in our study we will use the crisis dummy variable to study the 
relationship of the financial crisis with the earnings management. Thus, the 
variable has a value equal to one if the observation year is between 2008 and 
2012, and zero otherwise. It is expected negative signal because in period of 
crisis there is high audit quality and high quality of financial reporting, as 
explained by Cimini (2015) and Francis et al., (2013), so there is less earnings 
management and the earnings quality increases. 
III) Naveen et al., (2007) argued that the level of discretionary accruals increase to 
the payers of dividends, but not for firms that do not pay dividends. So, the 
authors conclude that there is evidence that earnings management is related to 
the dividend distribution, so we expect signal to be positive, because it decreases 
the earnings quality. Thus, we include the dividend dummy variable to control 
the impact of dividends on accounting choices, and it assumes value one if the 
company pays dividends, and zero otherwise. 
IV) The variable size is defined as natural logarithm of total assets, according to Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) and Lopes (2011). The size of the firm can 
have an impact on earnings management because the biggest firms have better 
accounting services as mentioned by Bradshaw et al., (2004), Warfield et al., 
(1995) and DeFond and Park, (1997). Watts and Zimmerman (1990) refers that 
there is an association between the size of the firm and accounting choices, 
because bigger firms tend to use accounting methods to modify the earnings. So, 
it is expected that firm size decrease the earnings quality, therefore firm size is 
positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
V) Sales growth is used as a proxy of firm growth and is calculated as Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) that defined as yearly percentage change in 
sales, so we use the following expression: [(Salest – Salest-1)/ Salest-1]*100.  
VI) Debt is a leverage variable, given by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, as 
calculated by Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008). The expected signal is 
positive because higher leverage means higher risk and costs. The managers aim 
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to avoid issues in the debt covenants, as mentioned by Bradshaw et al., (2004), 
Warfield et al., (1995) and Beatty and Weber (2003). 
VII) The variable country and the variable industry are dummy variables that allow 
us to study and to control the effects of the characteristics of different countries 
and industry, respectively. We classify the firms of our sample according to the 
48 Fama French (1997) industry classification codes. The variable country is 
calculated as the sum of 24 dummy variables of country and the variable 
industry is the sum of 36 dummy variables of industry. 
 
4.2. Empirical models 
The variables explained above result in a set of empirical models. For the study of the 
earnings management, we use as study measure the abnormal accruals.  
So, the first regression model is stated below: 
 
Where: 
TAit = Total accruals for firm i at year t; 
Assetsit-1 = Total assets for firm i at year t-1; 
ΔSalesit = ΔSalesit – ΔReceivablesit = change in sales for firm i at year t less change in 
receivables for firm i at year t 
PPEit = Net property, plant and equipment for firm i at year t; 
ROAit = Return on assets for firm i at year t; 
Εit = Error term for firm i at year t; 
This model is used by Kothari et al., (2005). It is identical to the modified version of the 
Jones (1991) but adds variables of return on assets (ROA). All variables, excluding 
ROA, are scaled by lagged assets to reduce heteroscedasticity and to allow comparison 
between firms. 
The dependent variable is the total accruals (TA) and is calculated as ΔCurrent assets – 
Δcash – Δcurrent liabilities + Δ Current portion of long-term debt – Depreciation and 
amortization, where Δ is a change between time t and time t-1. 
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Return on assets (ROA) is a control variable, introduced by Kothari et al., (2005) and 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. The authors suggest adding ROA as a 
control variable because it controls the effect of performance on discretionary accruals, 
i.e. allows to control the abnormal operating performance. 
Discretionary accruals measure, that is our estimate, is obtained through the residues of 
the equation. The residues were calculated industry to industry by EViews software. 
The equation above was estimated using OLS (ordinary least squares method).
The constant term reduces the heteroscedasticity and includes the variable ROA as a 
measure to control for firm performance, because it allows to detect abnormal operating 
performance (Kothari et al., 2005). 
Then, the model used to study the impact of the financial crisis in the earnings 
management and the relationship of dividend payments with the earnings management 
is the following: 
 
This model was built based on different literature, for example, Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008) and Silva (2013). The variables chosen for the model result from the 
conclusions of other studies that found out that the dividend distribution, the size of the 
company, the sales growth, the debt contracts, the country and the industry where the 
company operates have an impact on earnings management. 
The dependent variable in this model, discretionary accruals (DA) is the residues of the 
first equation. Thus, we calculate discretionary accruals in the first equation, which is 
the component of total accruals that can be manipulated. According to Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalan (2011), we consider the squared abnormal accruals as an inverse 
measure of earnings quality. When accruals deviate significantly, we assume that 
deviations are discretionary accruals and reduce the earnings quality. Then, we use 
squared discretionary accruals in the second equation in order to compare to the 
incentives to manipulate results, to the financial crisis and to the country and industry 
characteristic where the company operates.  
The two models were estimated using the methodology for panel data and this equation 
is estimated using OLS. 
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5. Results 
This section will present the results of the study. First, a descriptive analysis and 
correlation matrix will be presented, followed by empirical results. 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics to non-crisis period (2006-2007 and 2013-2014) and Panel B shows 
descriptive statistics to crisis period (2008-2012). 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Non-Crisis Period (2006-2007 and 2013-2014) 
 
DA DIV SIZE GROWTH DEBT 
 Mean 0,1428 0,6164 12,6507 102,7279 0,5465 
 Median 0,0028 1,0000 12,5389 5,2861 0,5299 
 Std. Dev. 5,6856 0,4863 2,6941 4141,5102 0,6723 
 Observations 8797 9262 5000 8888 9378 
            
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Crisis Period (2008-2012) 
 
DA DIV SIZE GROWTH DEBT 
 Mean 0,0530 0,6072 12,7000 479,2106 0,6111 
 Median 0,0027 1,0000 12,5955 4,7002 0,5338 
 Std. Dev. 0,6807 0,4884 2,6106 43401,3385 6,1678 
 Observations 11663 11833 9880 11461 11948 
Panel A shows the summary statistics to non-crisis period, presenting the mean, median, standard 
deviation and total number of observation. We analyse the variables DA (Discretionary accruals), 
Dividends (DIV), Firm Size (SIZE), Firm Growth (Growth) and Leverage (DEBT). The DA is squared 
discretionary accruals. Panel B presents the summary statistics to crisis period and shows the mean, 
median, standard deviation and total number of observation for the same variables of Panel A. 
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As you can see in table 4, the mean squared discretionary accruals decreases in the crisis 
period compared to the non-crisis period, decreasing from 0,1428 to 0,0530. Although 
less significant, the median follows the mean down. This analysis shows that firms 
make less earnings management in financial crisis periods. The mean of DIV in non-
crisis period is 61,64% and is very similar to crisis period, which is 60,72%.  
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrices that allow us to study the relationship between 
the variables used in the study. The correlation coefficients are not high, all values are 
less than 0,44 in absolute values, so there are no collinearity issues. 
Analysing table 5, we verified that dividend distribution and size are negatively related 
with discretionary accruals in non-crisis period and crisis period. But, the debt is 
negatively related with discretionary accruals in non-crisis period and positively 
correlated in crisis period. 
 
5.2. Multivariate Results 
The results of empirical model are obtained from OLS estimation. Table 6 shows the 
results to non-crisis period (Panel A) and to crisis period (Panel B).  
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix to Non-Crisis Period 
  DA DIV SIZE GROWTH DEBT 
DA 1,0000     
DIV -0,0525 1,0000    
SIZE -0,0389 0,4311 1,0000   
GROWTH 0,0109 -0,0283 -0,0156 1,0000  
DEBT -0,0358 0,0305 0,1189 -0,0273 1,0000 
      
Panel B: Correlation Matrix to Crisis Period 
  DA DIV SIZE GROWTH DEBT 
DA 1,0000     
DIV -0,0557 1,0000    
SIZE -0,0615 0,4375 1,0000   
GROWTH 0,0011 0,0058 -0,0055 1,0000  
DEBT 0,0962 -0,0207 -0,0070 -0,0063 1,0000 
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Table 6: Coefficients estimated to non-crisis and crisis periods 
Panel A: Coefficients estimated to non-crisis period 
Variable Coefficient Expected signal 
C 
0,4553 
 
(0,2094) 
 
DIV 
-0,0804 
+ (0,0567) * 
 
SIZE 
-0,0271 
+ (0,0126) ** 
 
GROWTH 
0,0000 
? (0,0000)*** 
 
DEBT 
-0,1672 
+ (0,0864) * 
 
Industry Dummies YES 
 Country Dummies YES 
 R-squared 0,0214 
 Adjusted R-squared 0,0070 
 F-statistic 1,4866 
 Prob(F-statistic) 0,0075   
 
Panel B: Coefficients estimated to crisis period 
Variable Coefficient Expected signal 
C 
0,1120 
 
(0,0591) 
DIV 
-0,0285 
+ 
(0,0151) ** 
SIZE 
-0,0103 
+ 
(0,0034) *** 
GROWTH 
0,0000 
? 
(0,0000)*** 
DEBT 
0,1058 
+ 
(0,0111) ** 
Industry Dummies YES 
 Country Dummies YES 
 R-squared 0,0215 
 Adjusted R-squared 0,0147 
 F-statistic 3,1386 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000   
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The standard errors are in parentheses below each coefficient and the significance are 
illustrated with ***, ** and *, which are the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
It can be observed that although the expected signal from the dividend distribution was 
positive, the coefficient has a negative signal in both financial crisis period and non-
financial crisis period. The value of the coefficient is reduced in the period of financial 
crisis and it is significant at 5%. This result of the investigation is opposed to the study 
of Naveen D. et al., (2007) that claim that firms that pay dividends are more likely to 
engage in earnings management than firms that do not pay dividends. This difference of 
signals can be explained by the sample used, or as mentioned by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2007) and Strobl (2008), incentives decrease in the financial crisis period because 
investors are vigilant and expect that there is a higher level of earnings management. 
Therefore, the results suggest that firms that pay dividends tend not to engage in 
earnings management. 
Similarly, it was expected that big firms have more tendency to earnings management. 
However, it appears to have a negative coefficient and it is significant at 5% and 1% in 
non-financial crisis period and financial crisis period, respectively. This result is 
contradictory to the study of Watts and Zimmerman (1990) that claim that the largest 
firms tend to use accounting methods to modify the earnings. However, larger firms 
tend to be audited, especially by a big 4, and as mentioned by Bradshaw et al., (2004) 
and Mitton (2002) companies audited by a big 4 have more accurate accounting 
information, so there is less earnings management. 
The coefficient of debt is positive in financial crisis period, as was the expected signal, 
and it is significant at 5%. This result is consistent with the suggested by Bradshaw et 
al., (2004), Warfield et al., (1995) and Beatty et al., (2002) because firms want to avoid 
issues in the debt covenants, so if financial crisis affect the firm’s results, this leads to 
earnings management. However, in a non-financial crisis period the firms with debt 
tend not to do earnings management. 
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6. Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to analyse whether the financial crisis motivates the earnings 
management, thus having an impact on earnings quality reported by firms. Apart from 
this question, we also focus on the study of the distribution of dividends as an incentive 
to earnings management. The study is evidenced by its importance and contribution, 
because it covers a large number of EU countries and the users of accounting 
information require quality and credible information. 
So, for the preparation of the study, we resorted to a sample of non-financial listed 
firms, over the period of 2006 to 2014, to the EU-25 countries. After several exceptions, 
the final sample consists of 2404 firms. 
First of all, it was necessary to use a model that calculates the discretionary accruals, 
which is used as a measure of earnings management. The model used for this purpose is 
the model of Kothari et al., (2005). After determining the discretionary accruals, we 
used a model with control variables for analysis of incentives for earnings management. 
The study results show that the non-financial listed European companies tend to 
manipulate less results in periods of financial crisis than in the period of financial non-
crisis. Since there is less earnings management, it is expected that the results of 
companies have lower quality in periods of financial crisis. 
Based on the tests results we can also argue that the majority of the variables are 
negatively correlated with discretionary accruals, in the financial crisis period and 
financial non-crisis period. In other words, it means that these variables are not an 
incentive to manipulate the results. Thus, companies that pay dividends, firm size and 
sales growth are not incentives to manipulate the results in financial crisis period and in 
financial non-crisis period. However, firms that have debts tend to manipulate more 
their results in a context of financial crisis period. 
This study has some limitations, such as the way it measures the results quality. We 
used the model of Kothari et al., (2005), however there are other models also based on 
accruals to study the results quality and other models that study other characteristics of 
the results as relevance, conservatism, persistence and predictability.  
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Since this topic is current, as future research suggestions, would be of interest to study 
the subject with other models and compare the results. It would also be relevant to 
include other independent variables as control variables, including whether the company 
is audited or not by a Big 4. In this regard, the study could be extended to the study of 
other incentives such as the remuneration of managers based on the results. 
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